A COMMENT ON FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA
Dean Rusk*
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Filartigacase probably will not stand as a landmark case with farreaching implications for the development of international law. It
is more likely to find its place as a legal oddity picked up in "but
see.

.

." footnotes by diligent scholars.

Filartigais one of the rare cases arising under a section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 U.S.C. § 1350), which established original
district court jurisdiction over all causes where an alien sues in
tort for a violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. The alleged facts presented an extreme case-the torture
to death of a seventeen-year-old boy by an Inspector General of
Police in Paraguay allegedly in retaliation for the political activities of the boy's father. The district court had dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, citing two recent cases decided
by the Second Circuit in 19751 and 1976, which were taken to mean
that the law of nations, referred to in section 1350 excluded law
that governs a state's treatment of its own citizens. The sole question before the Second Circuit was whether the alleged torture
was a violation of the law of nations within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1350, thus providing jurisdiction for the district court.
The merits of the allegations and other issues such as forum non
conveniens were not before the court.
One must begin by complimenting the Second Circuit for its decision in this case.' It is a common law court; the body of tort law
has been shaped over the centuries by the artistry of judges informed by a sense of fairness and justice. The facts alleged by the
Filartigas pointed to acts of extreme brutality, which must shock
any normal human being. It is entirely understandable that common law judges might feel that if such an act is not a violation of
the law of nations, it jolly well ought to be. The court decided accordingly. The Filartigas probably could not bring their action
under United States law for a tort committed in Paraguay. To tell
them that they must bring their action in Paraguay would be a cynical travesty. Under these circumstances, one can appreciate the
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decision and be tolerant of the gossamer web of authority woven
by the Second Circuit in getting there. The ghosts of many a common law judge would nod approvingly.
It might be well to note certain problems with the sources cited
by the Second Circuit to explain its conclusion that official torture
is now prohibited by the law of nations and that the dictum in
Dreyfus v. von Finck, to the effect that "violations of international
law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the
acting state," is clearly out of tune with the current usage and
practice of international law. That some of the sources cited simply
are not law does not detract from their value as contributions to
the fund of ideas upon which the court's decision rested. Clarity
about some of these sources would help the unwary to avoid reading too much into the Filartigacase for other purposes.
The court's decision emphasized the importance of the Paquete
Habana case,' quite rightly as supporting the proposition that
customary international law is a part of United States law and is
to be applied in the absence of any controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision. It has been generally supposed that
customary international law is founded in (a) the general practice
and usage of nations and (b) the recognition of such general practice as binding law. Regarding torture, all the words point in the
same direction. But what about general practice? Can one really
say that the prohibition of or abstention from official torture is
the general practice of nations? Does the annual report of the
State Department to the Congress on human rights around the
world confirm such a general practice? The court noted a survey5
finding that torture is prohibited, expressly or implicitly, by the
constitutions of more than fifty-five nations; what of the other 105
nations? In its opinion, the Second Circuit reminded us that the
Supreme Court was unable to find in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
6 that expropriation
Sabbatino
of a foreign-owned corporation's
assets without adequate and prompt compensation was in violation of international law because of the attitudes of socialists and
of many developing countries.
The Second Circuit might remind us that Paquete Habanaspoke
of the general assent of civilized nations. Among the sources of international law listed in article 38 of the Statute of the Interna175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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tional Court of Justice is "the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations." The phrase "civilized nations" has been
taken as an anachronism arising from the desire of the drafters to
stay as close as possible to the earlier statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice of the League of Nations. One is not
supposed to speak of uncivilized nations or peoples in the modern
world.
Where an outrageous act of official torture is concerned, perhaps we stop short of worrying about the truly general practice of
the community of nations. Rather, we concentrate on that community we secretly think of as "civilized." Thus, we would ignore
Idi Amin's Uganda, the torture of the officers and men of the
Pueblo by North Koreans and of prisoners of war in Vietnam and
of hostages in Iran. Likewise, we could brush aside the Gulag Archipelago, the hollowness of such titles as People's Democratic Republics, and the torture that we know occurs in a number of other
nations which are Members in good standing of the United Nations and which solemnly vote in favor of resolutions prohibiting
torture. To consult the practice of civilized nations is more dignified than to accept lip service in lieu of practice in support of a
claim of general usage. This approach involves a circular argument since we would not consider regimes practicing official torture as civilized nations. However, circular arguments are not unknown to the law.
In the Filartigacase, the Second Circuit leans upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1948 on the basis of a report from the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights. The simple fact is that this Declaration was not drafted or proclaimed to serve as law. Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt, then Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, in
presenting the Declaration to the General Assembly, said:
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary
importance that we keep clearly in mind the basic character of
the document. It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or
of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of
the General Assembly by formal vote of its members, and to
serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all
nations
XIX Bulletin, Department of State, No. 494, Dec. 19, 1948, at 751.
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As one of the authors of the instruction that Mrs. Roosevelt
received from her government on this point, I can report that
there was no question in Washington or in New York that the
Universal Declaration was not intended to operate as law. There
was no serious consultation with the appropriate committees or
Congress, as would have been essential had there been any expectation that law was coming into being. Indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt was
given great leeway in her part in the drafting of the Declaration
partly because it was understood that law was not being created.
The Second Circuit, also found support in Resolutions of the
U.N. General Assembly. In one Resolution passed in 1970, the
General Assembly declared that the Charter precepts embodied
in the Universal Declaration "constitute basic principles of international law." 8 Subsequently, in 1975, the General Assembly
adopted a Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture." The central question here is whether the
U.N. General Assembly has the authority under the Charter to
enact law on such matters. Clearly, the General Assembly can
make certain decisions that are legally binding or legally effective
when it (a) adopts a U.N. budget, (b) allocates the costs of the U.N.
among Members, (c) establishes subsidiary organs with their
terms of reference, and (d) supervises the internal housekeeping
of the United Nations itself, to name the most important. The
Charter, however, did not contemplate that the General Assembly
would be a legislative body in the field of international law generally. Article 13 states that the General Assembly shall initiate
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting
international cooperation in the political field and for encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codification. There is little doubt that a general legislative power vested
in the General Assembly would have prompted the Senate of the
United States to refuse advice and consent to the Charter. The
Charter sets forth the basic conditions for United States membership in the United Nations. There may be those who think that the
promotion of General Assembly Resolutions to the status of international law would be a major step forward in the development of
international law; they must keep in mind, however, that any such
assumed role could lead to the break up of the United Nations.

' G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
' G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp., the text of which is printed in the margin of
the Second Circuit's opinion.
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This sounds like a rather harsh warning; it is intended to be just
that. There are Members who simply would not submit to a fundamental change in the role of the General Assembly by stealth.
It is easy to point out that many General Assembly Resolutions
are passed without a formal vote but by consensus, and that others
are passed with near unanimity. It should be noted, however, that
votes cast with the knowledge that the result will not be law are
very different from votes that would be cast if there were a
general awareness that the result would be operationally and
legally binding. Resolutions of the General Assembly are entitled
to a considerable degree of respect, but one must be careful. A
General Assembly that was given limited powers when the United
Nations had fifty-one Members cannot expect those powers to be
increased significantly when there are 153 Members. Nations
representing less than ten percent of the world's population can
now cast a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly; new
Members recently have been admitted to theU.N. with populations approximately the same as Athens, Georgia. Perhaps the
most one can say is that the Assembly can contribute to that fund
of ideas from which courts could find, in the words of the Second
Circuit, "emerging principles" of customary international law
where other principles of law are present and compelling, if not
technically available, for the case at hand.
In its decision, the Second Circuit alluded to certain international treaties on human rights, including the American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The first two of
these were among the four treaties on human rights submitted by
President Carter to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1978.10
Neither in the court's opinion nor in the amicus brief filed in the
Filartigacase jointly by the Departments of Justice and State,
was reference made to the reservations, declarations, understandings, and statements that President Carter recommended that the
Senate include in its resolution of advice and consent." The effect
of these qualifications of the two treaties would be to render them
non-self-executing for the United States, requiring implementing
legislation to become effective as law in the United States.
Four Treatise Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the President of the United
States. S. Doc. No. Exec. C, D, E and F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
" See my Personal Reflection on International Covenants on Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 515 (1981).
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The questions raised in this comment do not go to the decision
of the Second Circuit on the merits of the specific case. They are
intended to inject a note of caution about reading too much into
the Filartigacase, a caution reflected both in the court's decision
and in the amicus brief submitted by the executive branch. It is
submitted that the decision does not mean that lip service has replaced actual practice in determining the existence of customary
international law. It does not mean that resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly create binding law. It does not mean that draft
treaties that are awaiting ratification can be asserted as law by
private individuals in an American court by claiming that they
become law under the heading of customary international law. If
the decision is taken to mean that those officials who commit
brutal acts of torture are advised to stay away from the United
States, most of us would applaud.
Finally, the opinion of the Second Circuit closed with an eloquent thought deserving special notice:
Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today,
giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence. 2
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 890.

